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Meeting the Need for Clear Guidelines: Protecting
Vulnerable Adults from Improper Limitation of
Medical Treatment in Institutions
Jane D. Hoyt*
and James M. Davies**
Though some hospital patients and nursing home residents
cannot speak or communicate clearly and may depend on nursing
staff for nasogastric or gastric feedings to maintain comfort and
life, they still remain able to experience life. Such patients may
look up with trusting eyes and expressions as care givers enter the
room. At times, for example when visitors are present, or music,
or just sunshine, there may be a very pleasant feeling in the room,
and these patients often seem content and happy. Some patients
who recover the ability to communicate reveal that they were
aware of their surroundings while too disabled to communicate.'
Both the professional literature2 and the popular press 3
abound with articles on the limitation of medical treatment for in-
stitutionalized people who are very ill, very old, and/or very dis-
abled. One article in the New England Journal of Medicine goes
so far as to specify that certain elderly persons, whom the authors
label "pleasantly senile," might be given resuscitative and inten-
sive care only "sparingly."4 The reader cannot help but speculate
what might be denied to those elderly individuals who wax and
* Chairperson of the Nursing Home Action Group/Minnesota. B.A., 1966,
Stanford University; Ed.M., 1967, Harvard University.
** Vice-Chairperson of Nursing Home Action Group/Minnesota. B.A., 1971, St.
John's University; M.A., 1974, University of Arizona; Certificate in Practical Nurs-
ing, 1976, Minneapolis Area Vocational Technical Institute; J.D., 1981, University of
Minnesota.
1. See generally Minneapolis Tribune, April 25, 1982, at 8A, col. 2; The Aware-
ness Factor, Omi, April 1985, at 22.
2. See generally Dennis Horan & Edward Grant, The Legal Aspects of With-
drawing Nourishment, 5 J. Legal Med. 595 (1984); Theodore A. Stern, Lifesaving
Treatment: Ethical and Practical Guidelines, 25 Consultant, J. Med. Consultation
133 (1985); Marshall Kapp, Legal and Ethical Implications of Health Care Reim-
bursement by Diagnosis Related Groups, 12 Law Med. & Health Care 245 (1984).
3. See generally Andrew Malcolm, Someday Il Tell the Children. .., Family
Circle, Sept. 3, 1985, at 32; Charles Krauthammer, What to do About "Baby Doe,"
The New Republic, Sept. 2, 1985, at 16.
4. Sidney H. Wanzer, S. James Adelstein, Ronald E. Cranford, Daniel D.
Federman, Edward Hook, Charles G. Moertel, Peter Safar, Alan Stone, Helen B.
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wane in "pleasantness" of personality. Other ethicists raise argu-
ments for caution in the area of limiting treatment.5
The Nursing Home Action Group (hereafter NHAG)6 in Min-
nesota believes all people, regardless of the severity of their disa-
bilities, should have access to food, water, and ordinary medical
treatment, and should have all of their constitutional rights
respected. In order to ensure that these rights are respected in in-
stitutional settings, NHAG has drafted the "Guidelines for the
Provision of Medical Treatment and Nursing Care."'7
This article will present a brief explanation of the need
for clear guidelines on medical care and treatment, a review of sev-
eral situations and legal cases demonstrating the need for clear
guidelines, and a presentation of the actual guidelines NHAG has
drafted to ensure protective decision making for vulnerable
patients.
I. The Need for Clear Guidelines
Opinions and beliefs regarding limitation of treatment differ
greatly, as do the definitions of basic terms used in health care de-
cision making, such as "supportive care only," "irreversible,"
"competent," and "imminent."8 Even medical terms such as "irre-
versible coma," "persistent vegetative state," and "dementia"9 have
varied meanings among physicians. This confusion ultimately has
life-and-death implications. In Re Elaine Pritchard ,10 a recent Cal-
ifornia case, demonstrates this very well. Elaine Pritchard's hus-
band asked the court for permission to remove a feeding tube--an
action which would have resulted in her death."1 Physicians had
reported to the court that the forty-three-year-old woman was in a
permanent coma;12 however, another consultant subsequently
found Mrs. Pritchard to be neither comatose nor "vegetative," but
Taussig, Jan van Eys, The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Pa-
tients, 310 New England J. of Med. 955 (1984).
5. See generally Horan & Grant, supra note 2, at 631; Mark Siegler & Alan
Weisbard, Against the Emerging Stream: Should Fluids and Nutritional Support Be
Discontinued? 145 Archives of Internal Med. 129 (1985); Daniel Callahan, On Feed-
ing the Dying, 13 Hastings Center Rep. 22 (1983); Gilbert Meilaender, On Remov-
ing Food and Water: Against the Stream, 14 Hastings Center Rep. 11 (1984).
6. The Nursing Home Action Group is a small organization in Minnesota
which advocates improvement in nursing home care and is a member group of the
United Handicapped Federation.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 90-99.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 91-93.
9. Ronald E. Cranford, Termination of Treatment in the Persistent Vegetative
State, 4 Seminars in Neurology 37 (1984).
10. No. 80125 (Super. Ct. Cal., San Mateo County Ct., Dec. 19, 1985).
11. Deny Death Request, Peninsula Times Tribune, June 28, 1985, at 3A, col. 1.
12. San Jose Mercury News, Dec. 14, 1985, at 3B.
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severely "demented."13 After this diagnosis, the husband with-
drew his request.14
More recently, in March 1986, the American Medical Associa-
tion's seven-member Judicial Council issued a "clarification and
expansion" of A.M.A. Opinion 2.15,15 an official statement entitled
"Terminal Illness,"16 in which the withholding of artificially sup-
plied nutrition, hydration, and medication, is now approved (but
not mandated). This is approved not only for terminally ill pa-
tients, but also for persons who are in a presumed irreversible
coma, though not terminally ill.17 Although A.M.A. Opinion 2.15
states there should be "safeguards to confirm the accuracy of the
diagnosis" and "concurrence of those who have responsibility for
the care of the patient,"'i8 the opinion offers no guidelines for the
protective procedures.
Without careful delineation of protective steps to be taken
preceding limitation of treatment, the frail patient might be denied
appropriate lifesaving or life-enhancing care and treatment. With-
out accompanying definitions, some common terms of medical eth-
ics may be confusing or useless when mentioned to patient, family,
or friends in a care conference, or when written on the discharge
summary of a patient being transferred to another health care fa-
cility. Good efforts are being made in some communities to stand-
ardize terminology used by nursing homes, hospitals, and the
emergency personnel who transport patients between facilities,19
but more intensive efforts are needed to educate both professionals
and consumers.
In Minnesota, many basic rights of hospital patients and nurs-
ing home residents, including the right to courteous and respectful
care, and to "[a]ppropriate care... designed to enable [patients] to
achieve their highest level of physical and mental functioning," 20
are protected by the Minnesota Hospital Patients and Nursing
Home Residents Bill of Rights.21 The Minnesota Vulnerable
13. Id.
14. New Diagnosis Ends Man's Court Battle to Let Wife Die, Los Angeles Her-
ald Examiner, Dec. 15, 1985, at A10.
15. "New Medicine" Raises Troubling Questions, Am. Med. News, Mar. 28,
1986, at 11, col. 4.
16. Judicial Council, American Medical Ass'n, Current Opinions of the Judicial
Council of the American Medical Ass'n 11 (1984).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Steven Miles & Timothy Crimmins, Orders to Limit Emergency Treat-
ment for an Ambulance Service in a Large Metropolitan Area, 254 J. A.M.A. 525,
526 (1985).
20. Minn. Stat. § 626.557 (1984 & Supp. 1985).
21. Minn. Stat. §§ 144.651-.652 (1984).
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Adult Protection Act mandates all health care personnel and en-
courages all other people to report suspected physical or mental
abuse and neglect.22 The Minnesota Supreme Court, while recog-
nizing the right to refuse treatment, has also recognized a state in-
terest in the preservation of life. 23 However, if the patients or
residents, family, friends, and health care personnel are not guided
by protective procedures and these persons do not have a clear un-
derstanding of terms and the possible consequences of decisions,
this may ultimately mean that the patients' or residents' right to
receive treatment or nourishment may be denied.
In addition to legislation, some private groups have attempted
to clarify the criteria for determining whether or not a patient
should receive treatment. In June of 1983, an ad hoc Task Force
on Supportive Care in Minnesota drafted guidelines which were
"one of the first practical attempts to deal with the issue of appro-
priate care for the elderly in the long-term care setting."24 These
guidelines recommended three categories of nursing home resi-
dents to be considered candidates for the withdrawal or noninitia-
tion of life-maintaining medical treatment:
A. Terminally Ill and Imminently Dying, for example,
from cancer or cardiac disease.
B. Severe and Irreversible Mental Disability, where the
resident demonstrates a significant inability to communicate,
or to interact meaningfully with the environment, and an un-
awareness of self and/or the environment; for example, those
with pre-senile and senile dementia... and.., strokes.
C. Severe and Irreversible Physical Disability, where
there may exist normal mental functioning but, because of
pain and suffering, or severe motor impairment, the resident
demonstrates a significant inability to interact physically in a
meaningful way with the environment; for example, those
with spinal cord injury, head trauma, emphysema, and amyo-
trophic lateral sclerosis. 25
As there is documented evidence of poor decision making
22. Minn. Stat. § 626.557 (1984 & Supp. 1985).
23. In re Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 339 (Minn. 1984). After
discussing the constitutional bases for a patient's right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment, the court in Torres recognized that this right is not absolute. The right
to refuse life-sustaining treatment has been balanced against the state's interest in
protecting its citizens. Such state interest includes: "(1) the preservation of life;
(2) the prevention of suicide; (3) the protection of innocent third parties; (4) and
the preservation of the ethical integrity of the medical profession." Id. (citing Com-
ment, Law at the Edge of Life: Issues of Death and Dying, 7 Hamline L. Rev. 431,
440 (1984)).
24. Task Force on Supportive Care, The Supportive Plan-Its Meaning and Ap-
plication: Recommendations and Guidelines, 12 Law Med. & Health Care 97, 98
(1984).
25. Id. at 99 (footnotes omitted).
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which has caused much suffering,26 there was general appreciation
that an important issue was being raised for consideration by the
task force. Indeed, the guidelines were being proposed to meet the
important need for more careful decision making. There was great
disappointment, however, that mental and physical disability
would be suggested as justifiable criteria for the withdrawal or
noninitiation of medical treatment. Representatives of twenty-one
local disability organizations unanimously passed a resolution on
September 24, 1983, opposing "the initiation of 'supportive-care-
only' plans/orders .... on the basis of physical or mental disabil-
ity." 27 In April of 1984 the Board of the United Handicapped Fed-
eration in Minnesota-an organization then consisting of twenty-
five member groups-adopted a four-point resolution affirming the
right of all persons to life-maintaining and life-enhancing care.28
The focus of the Task Force guidelines on physical and mental dis-
abilities made alternative guidelines imperative.
A recent study in Minnesota underscores the need for more
thorough and protective guidelines pertaining to the limitation of
treatment. 29 The study determined that approximately seventy-
three percent of nursing homes will accept care plans which limit
treatment, and sixty-six percent will accept "Do-Not-Resuscitate"
orders. 30 However, seventy-seven percent have no administrative
protocols for the implementation of limited treatment.31 Of
twenty limited-treatment care plans reviewed, only sixty percent
required periodic review, and only fifty-five percent called for co-
professional involvement. 32 Forty percent permitted limited treat-
ment to be initiated with a mere notation (e.g., "supportive-care-
only") by the doctor on the medical chart.33 Not one of the twenty
plans considered the need for guardianship where a patient is un-
able to either request or refuse a care plan which could hasten
death.34
26. Id. at 98.
27. Resolution passed by Solidarity Day Coalition, Minneapolis, Minnesota
(Sept. 24, 1986) (on file with Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice).
28. Resolution adopted by the United Handicapped Federation, St. Paul, Minne-
sota (April 12, 1984), quoted in Jane Hoyt & James Davies, A Response to the Task
Force on Supportive Care, 12 Law Med. & Health Care 103, 105 (1984); Letter from
the Minnesota Assn. for Retarded Citizens (July 13, 1984) (on file with Law & Ine-
quality: A Journal of Theory and Practice).
29. Steven H. Miles & Muriel B. Ryden, Limited-Treatment Policies in Long-
Term Care Facilities, 33 J. Am. Geriatrics Soc'y 707 (1985).
30. Id. at 708.
31. Id.
32. Id.




Lack of protocols or the use of simplistic protocols could
cause inadequate consideration of treatment plans, insufficient
documentation, lack of legal protection for health care givers, in-
adequate consent by the patient, and intolerable anguish for the
vulnerable patient, family, and friends. Further evidence of chaos
in this area of medical ethics comes from a survey of physicians at
a prominent teaching hospital affiliated with Harvard Medical
School.35 Some decline to comply with their patients' requests for
a "Do-Not-Resuscitate" order because that term, though not meant
to indicate limitation of treatment until heartbeat or breathing
stop, may in fact result in less care and treatment than was in-
tended.36 Of particular concern to advocates of disability rights is
the current emphasis on limitation of treatment which ignores cer-
tain unfortunate realities. These realities include the facts that
many patients live in substandard situations37 which could cause a
deterioration of physical and mental health, and that not all fami-
lies can be presumed to have the best interests of the patient in
mind.38
In Minnesota, the immediate need for clear, protective guide-
lines was demonstrated in July 1985, when the Minnesota Depart-
ment of Health issued three state licensing correction orders
against Abbott Northwestern Hospital "relating to the lack of Sup-
portive Care Only policies .... the failure to provide appropriate
care .... [and] the apparent lack of any attempt to involve the VA
[Vulnerable Adult] in the Supportive Care Only decision." 39 The
subject of the report was an elderly woman who had required
nursing home care after a recent broken hip.40 She had been hav-
35. Susann E. Bedell & Thomas L. Delbanco, Choices About Cardiopulmonary
Resuscitation in the Hospital, 310 New Eng. J. Med. 1089 (1984).
36. Id. at 1092.
37. See generally National Citizens' Coalition for Nursing Home Reform (here-
inafter NCCNHR), Consumer Statement of Principles for the Nursing Home Regu-
latory System-State Licensure and Federal Certification Programs 3-7, 102-104
(1983), (NCCNHR, 1309 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005); Committee on
Nursing Home Regulation, Institute of Medicine, Improving the Quality of Care in
Nursing Homes 3 (1986); Special Committee on Aging, United States Senate, Nurs-
ing Home Care: The Unfinished Agenda, May 21, 1986, at 3-16 (on file with Law &
Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice).
38. See generally Domestic Abuse Against the Elderly, Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Human Services of the House Select Comm. on Aging, 96th Cong. 1st
Sess. (Apr. 28, 1980); Abuse of Older Persons, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Human Services of the House Select Comm. on Aging, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (March
23, 1981).
39. Minnesota Department of Health, Office of Health Facility Complaints,
Summary Investigation Report (hereinafter OHFC Report), Case No. V85-299 (July
12, 1985) at 20. (Copies of cited reports on file with Law & Inequality: A Journal of
Theory and Practice).
40. Id. at 1.
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ing difficulty swallowing4' and was readmitted to the hospital in
"satisfactory" 42 condition for rehydration.43 According to the
Health Department report, the patient did not receive nutrition or
hydration during the six days44 prior to her death, despite her
charted requests, which stated she had "asked for some water,....
appears thirsty [and] pointing to mouth."45 Other medical
problems were not treated either.46
II. Standards of Care Affecting Quality of Life
Allocating treatments on the basis of a policy or institutional
assessment of "quality of life" or "active life expectancy" is
ageist in design and a resurrection of the spirit of the public
hygiene laws of the Nazi Germany. "Quality of life" should
enter decisions to limit treatment only by individual residents
exercising their autonomy, according to their personal experi-
ence of the benefits and burdens of continued treatment, after
full access to the social and medical resources needed to make
the most of a disabled existence. 47
A crucial factor which must be addressed when considering
the ethics of "limited care" decisions is that poor conditions and
low standards of care have been well documented in all too many
United States nursing homes.48 For example, at the Bryn Mawr
Nursing Home in Minneapolis, complaints about poor care were
substantiated in the early 1980's by the Minnesota State Depart-
ment of Health. These cases included a patient with a painful
bladder infection, who was not terminally ill, and was not given
curative treatment or kept comfortable.49 This patient was on a
"nursing supportive care list," although there was no physician's
order for the "supportive care," nor was there documentation that
the patient was involved in the decision to be treated with only
"supportive care" even though he appeared to respond appropri-
ately when he understood questions.50 Another patient with a
painful, foul-smelling, draining wound was not given curative
41. Id. at 2, 3.
42. Id. at 4.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 7-9.
45. Id. at 7.
46. Id. at 5.
47. Steven H. Miles, Nursing Home Policies to Limit Medical Treatment: Out of
the Closet and into the Light, 1 Minn. J. of Gerontology 9 (1985).
48. See generally NCCNHR, Institute of Medicine, Special Comm. on Aging,
supra note 37.
49. OHFC Report, supra note 39, Case No. 81-0153 (Apr. 2, 1981), at 1-5, 7. (Cop-
ies of cited case reports are on file with Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and
Practice).
50. Id. at 5.
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treatment until the Health Department intervened.51 Physician's
orders to ensure that specified patients received stated minimum
amounts of fluids were not properly followed.52 Patients were
awakened and put in their wheelchairs at dawn for the conven-
ience of the institution, but in violation of the Nursing Home Resi-
dents' Bill of Rights.53 Physical and verbal abuse of patients was
also documented.54 A patient under physician's orders to be re-
strained "night and day for safety" 55 fell several times. The last
time she was found face down in a cement stairwell, calling for
help. A head laceration had already clotted by the time she was
found. The Minneapolis Tribune provides an example of a patient
with a history of arson who was admitted to a health care facility.
At the time of a fatal fire at Bryn Mawr, the Minneapolis Tribune
reported that the patient who started the fire had a history of ar-
son and entered the facility with an inadequate admission his-
tory.56 OHFC reports indicate at the same time that an unnamed
patient with a history of arson had an inadequate care plan.57
Given the existing poor conditions in many nursing homes in
the United States, 58 is it possible and fair to pass judgment on a
patient's capacity to "interact meaningfully" with such an environ-
ment? Some guidelines use this ability as a criterion for denying
life-maintaining care and treatment. 59 It is terribly unjust to re-
quire persons living in such an environment to demonstrate a cer-
tain "quality of life" before receiving food, water, or ordinary
medicines. Many factors, including greed, mismanagement, budget
constraints, and negative attitudes towards people who are elderly,
ill, or have disabilities, contribute to poor conditions in some nurs-
ing homes. The proper response to the challenge presented by
substandard health care conditions and the consequent human suf-
fering is to improve the quality of services and the health of
patients.
51. Id., Case No. 81-0235 (May 28-29, 1981), at 1-4.
52. Id., Case No. V81-011 (June 17, 1981), at 1.
53. Id., Case No. 81-0272 (June 16, 1981), at 1, 2.
54. See id., Case No. 80-0231 (March 25, 1980), at 1-2; Case No. 80-0896 (Dec. 2,
1980), at 1-2; Case No. 81-0153 (Apr. 2, 1981), at 2, 6, 7.
55. Id., Case No. 80-0114 (Feb. 26, 1980), at 2.
56. Minneapolis Tribune, Sept. 28, 1979, at 1B, col. 1.
57. OHFC Report, supra note 39, Case No. 80-0696 (Oct. 2, 1980), at 1-5.
58. NCCNHR, Institute of Medicine, Special Committee on Aging, supra note
59. Hoyt & Davies, supra note 28, at 103.
[Vol. 4:355
NURSING HOME GUIDELINES
III. The Conroy and Jobes Cases: Legalizing Starvation
in Nursing Homes
The moral and ethical dilemmas raised by limited-care re-
quests are strikingly illustrated by a January 1985 case, In Re
Claire C. Conroy.60 In this case, the New Jersey Supreme Court
established criteria by which a legal guardian of an elderly nursing
home resident may authorize discontinuance of life-sustaining
care-including nasogastric feedings.6 1
Although Ms. Conroy had died while the case was being ap-
pealed, the court decided to address the issues raised by her guard-
ian's request to discontinue the nasogastric feedings. The court
ruled that in certain very restricted circumstances, a legal guard-
ian may authorize discontinuance of life-sustaining treatment-in-
cluding nasogastric feeding tubes-from elderly nursing home
residents who were formerly competent but who have serious and
irreversible mental and physical impairments. The ruling covers
those "who will probably die within approximately one year even
with the treatment,"6 2 although they need not be comatose or un-
responsive.6 3 The decision must be approved by the attending phy-
sician, two independent physicians, and the state ombudsman of
the Office of the Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly, and
must meet the criteria of a "subjective" standard or one of two
theoretically more objective "best interests" tests, as summarized
below:
1) The subjective standard: "life-sustaining treatment
may be withheld or withdrawn from an incompetent patient
when it is clear that the particular patient would have refused
the treatment under the circumstances involved." 64
2) The limited-objective test: "there is some trustworthy
evidence that the patient would have refused the treatment,
and the decision-maker is satisfied that it is clear that the bur-
dens of the patient's continued life with the treatment out-
weigh the benefits of that life for him. By this we mean that
the patient is suffering, and will continue to suffer throughout
the expected duration of his life, unavoidable pain, and that
the net burdens of his prolonged life (the pain and suffering of
his life with the treatment less the amount and duration of
60. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
61. A nasogastric feeding tube is a simple, flexible tube inserted (usually by a
nurse) in the nose and down the esophagus to the stomach for feeding a patient
who is unable to take food by mouth. In this manner, a patient may be fed a liquid
diet which provides all nutrients needed for maintaining health.
62. In re Claire C. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 342, 486 A.2d at 1219. See also Richard A.
McCormick, Caring or Starving? The Case of Claire Conroy, America, April 6, 1985,
at 269.
63. 98 N.J. at 358-59, 486 A.2d at 1229.
64. Id. at 360, 486 A.2d at 1229.
19861
Law and Inequality
pain that the patient would likely experience if the treatment
were withdrawn) markedly outweigh any physical pleasure,
emotional enjoyment, or intellectual satisfaction that the pa-
tient may still be able to derive from life." 65
3) The pure-objective test: There is no trustworthy evi-
dence that the patient would have refused the treatment, and
"the net burdens of the patient's life with the treatment
should clearly and markedly outweigh the benefits that the pa-
tient derives from life. Further, the recurring, unavoidable
and severe pain of the patient's life with the treatment should
be such that the effect of administering life-sustaining treat-
ment would be inhumane. '66
Under both the limited objective test and the pure objective test,
certain family members as well as the guardian must agree to the
discontinuation of treatment.6 7 The New Jersey Supreme Court
does call for extreme caution in determining the patient's intent
and in evaluating medical evidence of the patient's condition.68 It
expressly declined to authorize decision making "based on assess-
ment of the personal worth or social utility of another's life, or the
value of that life to others."69
Based on the record before it, the court found that the cir-
cumstances of Claire Conroy's situation did not meet the criteria
of any of the three tests. Had she not died (with the nasogastric
tube in place), 70 the court would have remanded the case for fur-
ther consideration. She died from existing ailments which in-
cluded arteriosclerotic heart disease, diabetes, and hypertension.71
When the litigation commenced, Claire Conroy was not comatose
or considered to be suffering a terminal illness; she did react in
some ways to her environment, such as by smiling.72
Although the court correctly found that the circumstances of
Ms. Conroy at the time the litigation commenced did not meet the
criteria established for discontinuing life-sustaining treatment, the
decision is nonetheless very unfortunate because, despite safe-
guards, the court still permits discontinuation of nourishment
from elderly patients who are not terminally ill and imminently
dying.
One major flaw in the court's argument is the use of pain as a
65. Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 384-85, 486 A.2d at 1242.
68. Id. at 368, 486 A.2d at 1233.
69. Id. at 367, 486 A.2d at 1232-33.
70. Id. at 337-38, 486 A.2d at 1217-18.
71. Id. at 341, 486 A.2d at 1219.
72. Id. at 337, 486 A.2d at 1217.
[Vol. 4:355
NURSING HOME GUIDELINES
criterion for withholding treatment. 73 Most, if not all, pain can be
alleviated. 74 Much of the pain suffered by long-term care resi-
dents, such as bedsores and contractures, can be prevented by good
nursing and medical care.75 When patients with severe disabilities
are experiencing pain, the proper goal of medical and nursing care
must be to alleviate this pain, rather than to terminate the life of
the patient.
A serious problem with the Conroy subjective standard76 is
that a patient may have clearly expressed earlier that he or she
would never want nasogastric or gastric feedings, but later be-
comes reconciled to his or her condition and enjoys the company of
other people and other activities. If this patient is now unable to
speak or communicate clearly, she will not be able to indicate a
change of mind or heart in order to receive nourishment.
Under Conroy, it is not clear what age is to be considered
"elderly." Regardless of the clarity, any age standard is an unac-
ceptable form of discrimination. It is frequently not possible to
predict who can be expected to die within "approximately one
year." And indeed, the expectation in this context might hasten or
even cause death. The court does not seem to allow for the fact
that with proper care, patients may show slight or dramatic im-
provement despite expectations to the contrary. 77 The Conroy de-
cision takes a procedurally cautious but significant step toward
legalized killing, a kind of capital punishment for selected elderly
nursing home residents who are experiencing pain.
Even before A.M.A. Opinion 2.15 on "Terminal Illness" was
expanded, some ethicists expressed concern that involuntary eu-
thanasia threatened persons who were mentally dysfunctional but
neither terminally ill nor in pain.78 In re Jobes 79 may heighten
73. Justice Handler, concurring in part and dissenting in part, criticizes the pain
criterion from a very different perspective. Id. at 394-95, 486 A.2d at 1247-49.
74. See generally International Association for the Study of Pain, Pain (Fourth
World Congress on Pain, Aug. 31-Sept. 5, 1984, Supp. 2, 1984); Judith A. Paice, In-
trathecal Morphine Sulfate for Intractable Cancer Pain, 16 J. Neurosurgical Nurs-
ing 237 (1984); R.E. Richardson, Intracranial Stimulation for the Control of
Chronic Pain, 31 Clinical Neurosurgery 316 (1983); Donlin M. Long, Stimulation of
the Peripheral Nervous System for Pain Control, 31 Clinical Neurosurgery 323
(1983); Samuel Mines, The Conquest of Pain (1974).
75. French's Index of Differential Diagnosis (F.D. Hart ed., 11th ed. 1979).
76. 98 N.J. at 341, 486 A.2d at 1219.
77. Justina Tanhehco & Paul E. Kaplan, Physical and Surgical Rehabilitation
of Patient After 6-Year Coma, 63 Archives of Physical Med. and Rehabilitation 36
(1982).
78. See generally Evelyn W. Lusthaus, Involuntary Euthanasia and Current At-
tempts to Define Persons with Mental Retardation as Less Than Human, 23 Mental
Retardation 148 (1985); Yale Kamisar, The Real Quinlan Question Lives On, Min-
neapolis Star & Tribune, June 18, 1985, at 11A, col. 1.
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such concerns. In 1980, Mrs. Jobes lost much of her mental and
physical functions after medical malpractice in which her brain
was deprived of oxygen. Shortly after the onset of disability, she
was placed in a nursing home.8 0 Mrs. Jobes' husband and family
petitioned a New Jersey court in 1985 for permission to withdraw
a successfully functioning feeding tube from her, which would ef-
fect her death by starvation and dehydration.81 Despite general
agreement that thirty-one-year-old Mrs. Jobes was severely dis-
abled, there was substantial and conflicting testimony in court
from medical experts regarding Mrs. Jobes' capacity to feel pain
and respond to stimuli.82 The petitioners' attorney entered the
March 1986 version of A.M.A. Opinion 2.15 into evidence.83 On
April 23, 1986, the court ruled that Mrs. Jobes may be starved to
death.8 4 The case is currently being appealed.85
At its April meeting, the Board of the United Handicapped
Federation (a disability rights coalition of twenty-nine groups in
Minnesota with approximately 13,000 members) discussed the im-
plications of the Jobes case and voted to write an amicus curiae
brief supporting Mrs. Jobes' right to continued nourishment.8 6
Based in part on the experience of some UHF members who have
recovered from presumed permanent coma, the Board also passed
a Resolution in response to A.M.A. Opinion 2.15:
BE IT RESOLVED that the United Handicapped Federation
considers full access to nutrition and hydration, and to ordi-
nary medical treatment, including antibiotics, whether admin-
istered by usual physical means or by artificial or technological
assistance, to be a basic right of all persons, regardless of age,
whether or not they have disabilities, and whether or not they
are terminally ill.
FURTHER, the United Handicapped Federation recognizes
that in some rare instances of terminal cancer or other severe
illness, the provision of nutrition and fluids can be hurtful due
to metabolic problems, even hastening death, and thus it may
be medically and ethically appropriate to limit medical treat-
ment and/or nutrition and fluids during the terminally ill pa-
tient's final days....
MOST IMPORTANT is the proper monitoring of all treatment
and care during severe illness so that treatment and care are
79. In re Jobes, No. C-4971-85E (Super. Ct. N.J., Ch. Div.-Morris County, Apr.
23, 1986) at 2 (on file with Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice).
80. Id. at 2-3.
81. Id. at 1.
82. Id. at 6-8.
83. Id. at 14.
84. Id. at 16-17.
85. Newark Star-Ledger, April 24, 1986, at 1.




IV. A Response: Protective Guidelines Proposed
Recognizing the ambiguity and difficulty of interpretation in-
herent in existing laws and regulations, the Nursing Home Action
Group has drafted "Guidelines for the Provision of Medical Treat-
ment and Nursing Care." These Guidelines seek to protect the
vulnerable adult. The vulnerable adult is defined under Minne-
sota law as a person over the age of eighteen who, because of
mental, physical, or emotional impairment, is "unable or unlikely
to report abuse or neglect without assistance."8 8 Nursing staff
should not be put in the position of taking care of patients who are
unnecessarily suffering pain and dying because someone, however
well-intentioned, decided that these patients should die rather
than receive basic nourishment and treatment.
The NHAG Guidelines define the denial of treatment and
care as a violation of basic civil and human rights. NHAG has pro-
posed these Guidelines in order that people who are elderly, dis-
abled, or ill may live and die in comfort and dignity. International
standards of human rights, moral principles respecting the value of
human life, and the guarantee of equal protection of the law in the
United States Constitution demand nothing less.
87. Resolution adopted by the United Handicapped Federation, St. Paul, Minne-
sota (April 10, 1986) (on file with Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and
Practice ).
88. Minn. Stat. § 626.557(2)(b)(3) (1985).
1986]
Law and Inequality
GUIDELINES FOR THE PROVISION OF MEDICAL
TREATMENT AND NURSING CARE89
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MINNESOTA VULNERABLE
ADULT PROTECTION ACT, MINNESOTA NURSING HOME
RESIDENTS' BILL OF RIGHTS, AND UNITED STATES CON-
STITUTIONAL STANDARDS OF DUE PROCESS
PREAMBLE
The purpose of these guidelines is to ensure that the criteria
for making decisions about technology and ordinary and "ex-
traordinary" treatment will be the same for all persons, regardless
of physical or mental disability. This purpose is in accord with
public policy of the state of Minnesota: "to protect adults who, be-
cause of physical or mental disability or dependency on institu-
tional services, are particularly vulnerable to abuse or neglect."9 0
All levels of staff in health care facilities should be en-
couraged to consider that "where there is life, there is hope." Re-
search gives reason to expect increasing improvement from many
disabilities, including Alzheimer's disease, stroke, diabetes, and spi-
nal cord injury. Health care givers should be instructed that pa-
tients who may not be capable of normal speech usually
understand more than they can express; that adult patients must
be treated as adults; and that active encouragement is a significant
factor in rehabilitation. A patient may be incapable of ordinarily
articulate, physical communication yet able to have meaningful,
emotional, mental, and aesthetic experiences and to communicate
with receptive persons.
It is acknowledged that no set of guidelines can resolve all
questions raised by rapidly changing medical technology and by
conflicting ethical values and medical opinions.
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I. PRINCIPLES
A. The life of a person with mental or physical disabilities
has the same intrinsic value as that of a person described as nor-
mal or healthy or able-bodied.
B. The primary goal of health care givers (physicians, nurs-
ing staff, social workers, therapists) shall always be to encourage
and promote the best physical, mental, emotional, social, and spiri-
tual health of which each patient is capable. Both competent and
incompetent patients shall be encouraged to participate in making
decisions about their own care.
C. Orders for the withdrawal of treatment or non-initiation
of treatment shall never be written on the basis of physical or
mental disability. Nursing and medical personnel shall never sug-
gest such orders to a patient, a family, or a guardian because of the
patient's disability.
D. Denial of essential, life-maintaining care and life-enhanc-
ing care because of mental or physical disabilities is a violation of
basic civil and human rights.
E. Food and water, or comparable nourishment, shall al-
ways be offered to all patients; however, it is acknowledged that
for a person who is irreversibly, irreparably, and terminally ill and
for whom death is imminent, the goal of nourishment may be com-
fort rather than prolonging life.
F. A medical care plan which does not prolong life may be
determined to be appropriate for a person who is irreversibly, ir-
reparably, and terminally ill, and for whom death is imminent.
G. No person in our society should be forced to choose be-
tween quality of life and length of life. Considerations of economic
policy shall not be used as a justification for denying high-quality
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medical and nursing care to persons who are elderly, infirm, dis-
abled, or poor.
H. A legally and clearly competent patient has the right to
refuse specific treatments, as protected in the Minnesota Nursing
Home Residents'/Patients' Bill of Rights and as developed in com-
mon law.
I. Whenever the facility and/or physician plays a role in a
decision concerning a patient, it shall be the responsibility of the
institution and/or physician to ensure that the patient's rights are
fully protected.
J. The best interests of the patient are paramount. Though
family involvement in decision making may be very helpful, health
care givers and physicians should be cautioned that the traditional
presumption of family concern for the welfare of its members
must be balanced with growing awareness of the extent of family
violence and neglect in the United States.
K. After disability has occurred, an individual's new, posi-
tive opinion of self-worth, and of the value of life after disability,
shall take precedence over any earlier decision, such as a "living
will" or similar statement, to decline or discontinue treatment if
disability occurs.
II. DEFINITIONS
A. "Caregiver" means any person (such as nursing staff,
physician, social worker, therapist) or health care facility having
responsibility for the care of a patient.
B. "Essential, life-maintaining care" means care, including
food and water, and curative treatments, which will sustain and/or
save life.
C. "Irreversible" illness means that "no known therapeutic
measures can be effective in reversing the course of the illness." 91
D. "Irreparable" condition of the body means "the course of
illness has progressed beyond the capacity of existing knowledge
and technic to stem the process." 92
E. "Imminent" death means that "in the ordinary course of
events, death probably will occur within a period not exceeding
two weeks."93
F. "Supportive-care-only" means a "death-allowing care
goal," that is, care which does not afford the patient curative treat-
91. Mitchell T. Rabkin, Gerald Gillerman, & Nancy R. Rice, Orders Not to Re-





ments, such as antibiotics or surgery, for the purpose of preserving
life. Treatment is offered for comfort only, but not for the purpose
of maintaining life. Sometimes the terms, "comfort-care-only" or
"limited-care-only" are used.
G. "Do-Not-Resuscitate" means a medical order, written
with documentation in a patient's medical record, providing that
resuscitative measures will not be used in the event of cardiac or
respiratory arrest. The "D.N.R." may be written as a specific or-
der in a medical chart. The "D.N.R." order properly applies only
in the event of cardiac or respiratory arrest, and the "D.N.R." may
be consistent with aggressive, curative treatment of illness. The
"D.N.R." order is a very different concept from "supportive-care-
only," "comfort-care-only," or a "dealth-allowing care goal." The
common element of "D.N.R." and "supportive-care-only"/"death-
allowing care goal" is that resuscitation is not attempted in the
event of cardiac or respiratory arrest; however, the goal of care
before such an event may be very different.
H. "Legally and clearly competent" means that the person
is not only "competent" in the sense of not being under guardian-
ship or conservatorship, but also that he/she can obviously and
fully understand the meaning and consequences of available
treatments.
I. "Legally or clearly incompetent" means that the person,
whether or not adjudicated incompetent, cannot fully understand
the meaning and consequences of available treatments. A "ques-
tionably competent" person is considered incompetent within
these guidelines and receives the protections and rights of an in-
competent person.
J. A "disability" means a physical and/or mental dysfunc-
tion which may be either chronic or acute and which may or may
not involve current physical illness.
III. GUIDELINES
A. Primary goal of caregivers. The primary goal of health
care givers shall always be to encourage the best physical, mental,
emotional, social, and spiritual health of which each patient is
capable.
B. Information about rights and treatment.
1. As required by the Minnesota Patient's Bill of Rights,
"[p]atients and residents shall, at admission, be told that there are
legal rights for their protection during their stay at the facility and
that these are described in an accompanying written state-
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ment. . . ."94 Further, "section 144.651 shall be posted conspicu-
ously in a public place in all facilities licensed under [these
laws]." 95
2. As required by the Patients' Bill of Rights, "[p]atients and
residents shall be given by their physicians complete and current
information concerning their diagnosis, treatment, alternatives,
risks, and prognosis as required by the physician's legal duty to
disclose."9 6
C. Denial of treatment.
1. Denial of essential, life-maintaining and life-enhancing
care because of mental or physical disabilities is a violation of basic
civil and human rights and shall never be suggested to a patient, a
family, or a guardian.
2. Food and water, or comparable nourishment, will always
be offered to all patients; however, it is acknowledged that for a
person who is irreversibly, irreparably, and terminally ill, and
death is imminent, the goal of nourishment may be comfort rather
than prolonging life.
3. Denial of treatment to persons with mental or physical
disabilities is a violation of basic rights and is required to be re-
ported by care givers under the Vulnerable Adult Protection Act
in Minnesota. 97 This Act encourages anyone else having knowl-
edge or suspicion of abuse or neglect of a vulnerable adult to re-
port to authorities.
D. Decision making by the patient who is legally and clearly
competent.
1. The legally and clearly competent patient shall be en-
couraged to participate in decision making to the fullest extent
possible.
2. The right of a competent patient to refuse specific treat-
ments, as protected in the Minnesota Patients' or Residents' Bill of
Rights and as developed in common law, shall be respected.
3. Medical and nursing staff shall not assist in suicide.
4. Before a facility may comply with a patient's refusal of a
life-maintaining treatment, there shall be a detailed documenta-
tion in the medical record:
a. that the patient is legally and clearly
competent,
94. Minn. Stat. § 144.651(4) (1985).
95. Minn. Stat. § 144.652(1) (1985).
96. Minn. Stat. § 144.651(9) (1985).
97. Minn. Stat. § 626.557 (1985).
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b. that the patient made the decision freely and
without duress,
c. that the patient's intentions have been clearly
interpreted,
d. that, as ascertained by clinical evaluation, the
patient is not suffering from psychological depression or
the effects of chemical use,
e. that the patient was, before refusing a treat-
ment, fully informed of the range of available treat-
ments and their consequences, as well as the
consequences of nontreatment,
f. that the patient was encouraged to, and given
agreed-upon time to, reconsider the decision,
g. that possible extenuating environmental fac-
tors98 have been considered as potentially influencing
the patient's decision, and
h. that the patient was given the opportunity to
summon relatives, friends, advocates, or professionals
for alternative counseling in the matter.
5. If a patient refuses a treatment, the physician or the facil-
ity may request the patient to sign a statement, acknowledging
that the refusal was an informed decision.
E. Decision making for the patient who is legally or clearly
incompetent or who is "questionably competent."
1. The legally or clearly incompetent or "questionably com-
petent" patient shall be encouraged to participate in decision mak-
ing to the fullest extent possible. Staff shall attend especially
carefully to the aphasic patient, who may say "no" when meaning
to say "yes," or may make similar speech errors.
2. When a major medical or life-and-death decision involves
an incompetent or "questionably competent" person, a sincerely
interested family member or friend should assume the responsibil-
ity of guardianship, or a guardian ad litem should be appointed.
(See exception at 3. below.)
3. It is not always necessary that a guardian be appointed
for a patient who is irreversibly, irreparably, and terminally ill,
and for whom death is imminent, in order for the goal of health
care to be the support of emotional and physical comfort and se-
curity of the person throughout the dying process.
4. If a decision involves limitation of medical care, it shall be
documented in detail that the guardian fully understands the deci-
98. See inyfra p. 375.
1986]
Law and Inequality
sion and its consequences, and that the decision does not violate
guardianship law.
5. The decisions of a legal guardian may be challenged in ac-
cordance with guardianship law.
6. The best interests of the patient are paramount. The
wishes of family and friends should be considered, but only insofar
as they clearly reflect a sincere commitment to and understanding
of the best interests of the patient. The wishes of family and
friends to preserve the life of the patient should be respected un-
less there is no beneficial medical way to do this.
7. Decisions about patients who are:
a. severely disabled in any way,
b. poor,
c. leaving an inheritance, or
d. without close friends or relatives, shall be particularly
carefully monitored.
F. Provision of emergency medical treatment.
1. Emergency medical treatment (from fire department
paramedics, "Code" team, or "Dr. Blue" team) shall be given to
any patient in the event of injury or accident, such as choking on
food.
2. Terminally ill patients shall receive emergency treatment
for accident or injury not related to terminal illness.
G. Treatment when there is irreversible, irreparable, termi-
nal illness, and death is imminent.
1. When it becomes clear that a person is irreversibly and ir-
reparably and terminally ill, and death is imminent, it then may
become appropriate for the goal of health care to be the assurance
of the patient's physical and emotional comfort and security
throughout the dying process.
a. As with all other medical judgments, this goal
shall be open to re-evaluation at all times.
b. All medical and nursing treatments and care
which are necessary for the physical and psychological
comfort of the patient shall be provided.
c. "Heroic measures," or "extraordinary" care/
treatment, may sometimes be considered of no benefit to
the individual. It should be acknowledged that the
meaning of "extraordinary care/treatment" changes as
rapidly as the state of the art of medicine. Whatever
"extraordinary" care/treatment is taken to mean, the
(Vol. 4:355
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meaning of it is the same for all patients, whether termi-
nally ill or not.
d. A medical plan that includes a "death-allowing
care goal" must be reviewed weekly by the doctor and
renewed if still appropriate.
e. If such a medical and nursing care plan is re-
newed two times, or if there is any other reason to ques-
tion the diagnosis or prognosis, an independent second
medical opinion must be obtained.
f. It is improper to write "supportive-care-only,"
"comfort-care-only," or "death-allowing care goal" as a
specific order; however, this concept of care may be in-
cluded in a medical and nursing care plan if appropriate.
g. The "Do-Not-Resuscitate" order may be appro-
priate when there is irreversible, irreparable illness, and
death is imminent.
2. It shall be the responsibility of the primary physician to
document that all parties involved in the decision-making process
understand that such a health care goal may hasten death.
3. Medical orders and nursing care and medical plans must
reflect the specific needs of each individual patient. This applies to
all patients, including those who are terminally ill.
4. When doubts about diagnosis or prognosis cannot be
clearly resolved by medical professionals, full curative treatment
shall be provided to the patient.
5. While the goal of care may, if appropriate, no longer be to
prolong the life of a patient who is irreversibly, irreparably, and
terminally ill, and imminently dying, the standards of nursing and
medical care may not be lessened.
6. Experience with improper "Supportive-Care-Only" orders
and "Do-Not-Resuscitate" orders gives evidence that environmen-
tal factors must always be considered whenever evaluating the
health status of institutionalized persons because the health of
nursing home residents may deteriorate due to environmental fac-
tors which could and should be improved. Considerations shall in-
clude, but not be limited to, the following as they affect the
individual patient:
a. Do the facility's nursing and medical care, and
social services, meet standards defined by state and fed-
eral rules and regulations?
b. Does the environment encourage meaningful,
supportive interaction between residents and others?
c. Are meaningful, life-enriching activities avail-
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able for all residents at the facility, and are residents en-
couraged to participate?
d. Are all patients' civil and human rights fully
protected? Are patients and guardians encouraged to
exercise these rights?
e. Is the patient free of medications which may
cause:
-diminished activity and/or
-- diminished motivation and/or
-other debilitating side effects (such as lack of
communication)?
H. Decision making in advance.
1. When there is evidence of pre-disability decision making
such as "living wills" or similar statements made by patients while
able-bodied, medical and nursing staff must be alert to the fact
that some persons may change their minds after disability occurs.
2. Staff shall look for and document any indications that the
patient (whether competent or incompetent) has a changed out-
look on life, because a person's new, positive opinion of self-worth,
and of the value of life after disability, shall take precedence over
any earlier decision to decline or discontinue treatment if disability
occurs.
I. Access to advocacy resources. It is the responsibility of
the facility to inform or remind each patient, and patients' guardi-
ans, of the availability of independent advocates (such as the
Ombudsman Program, Legal Services, other advocates, or friends
of the patient's choice) and to assist the patient in contacting an
independent advocate.
J. Terminology.
1. The use of terms like "supportive care" and "supportive-
care-only" shall be avoided because such terms are misleading.
2. If what is meant by "supportive-care-only" is that treat-
ment will be ordered only to maintain comfort-not to maintain
life-then a more accurate, descriptive term, such as "death-al-
lowing care goal" or "limited care only" shall be used, but such
terms shall never be written by themselves as medical orders.
3. It shall be documented in the medical record that all par-
ties involved in a decision-making process about the goal of health
care understand the meaning of the terms used and the probable




The welfare of nursing home residents will be better pro-
tected by:
A. A brochure for consumers and health care professionals
in every acute and long-term care facility, clearly explaining the
spectrum of care which patients or residents may request or be of-
fered, from aggressive/curative care to a death-allowing care goal.
B. A written statement, at each health care facility, of phi-
losophy and policy with respect to the kinds of care available.
C. Explanations of available kinds of care, presented along
with other orientation materials when a patient enters a facility
and again whenever the health status of the patient warrants a re-
consideration of major health care goals.
D. Support groups and referral services enabling patients,
relatives, and friends who are coping with life-and-death decisions
to discuss their experiences and options with persons who have
faced similar difficulties.
E. A regular, external review process in nursing homes,
done by professionals and experienced consumers who are com-
pletely independent of the institution, to monitor the appropriate-
ness of care plans with death-allowing care goals and "Do-Not-
Resuscitate" orders.
F. The formation in nursing homes of human rights com-
mittees composed of persons not employed by the facility. The
purpose of these committees will be to help ensure protection of
civil rights to every nursing home resident, for example, to help
ensure that no resident is denied medical, nursing, habilitative, or
rehabilitative care on the discriminatory basis of mental or physi-
cal disability. Examples of specific concerns might be:
- A resident has expressed the desire to be taken out-
doors occasionally but is never given the opportunity.
- A resident has expressed a desire for normal meals
and has demonstrated the ability to feed him/herself. The physi-
cian, however, has ordered naso-gastric tube feedings for breakfast
and dinner.
- Residents are awakened at 5:30 a.m. but are given
nothing to do until breakfast is served several hours later.
It may be appropriate for nursing home staff also to form a
human rights committee; however, a staff committee would not
take the place of the more independent, non-employee human
rights committee. A model for the latter is presented below.
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PROPOSAL FOR A NURSING HOME HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMITTEE
The human rights committee could be developed as part of
the friends and relatives group or "family and friends council" of
each nursing home. This committee would be distinct from the
residents' advisory council, which Minnesota law clearly allows
residents and their family the right to participate in and
organize. 99
The committee shall function independent of the administra-
tion and staff of the facility. Its membership shall not include ad-
ministrators, staff, part-time employees, or consultants retained by
the facility.
The purpose of the human rights committee shall be to advo-
cate for the civil and human rights and quality of services due all
residents. Should adversary conditions develop between the ad-
ministration and/or staff and one or more residents, the committee
shall represent what it believes to be the best interests of the resi-
dent(s). The human rights committee shall not, however, take the
place of other advocacy resources.
The human rights committee shall have seven to nine mem-
bers, including at least two persons from categories "a" and "b"
and one person from the remaining categories:
a) family members or guardians who visit at least once a
week,
b) significant friends who visit at least once a week,
c) representatives of the religious community,
d) interested citizens from the community,
e) non-staff professionals with experience in rehabilitation.
If possible, a resident of the facility should also be on the
committee.
The committee shall solicit information, advice, and concerns
from the administration and staff of the facility, as well as from
residents and their families and friends. In turn, the committee
shall provide consultation to the facility director, board of direc-
tors, and staff.
The committee shall meet at least quarterly. Membership
shall not be more than three years' duration.
99. Minn. Stat. § 144.651(27) (1985). The statute provides that "[r]esident and
family councils shall be encouraged to make recommendations regarding facility
policies."
[Vol. 4:355
